In vitro gametogenesis and reproductive cloning:Can we allow one while banning the other? by Segers, Seppe et al.
 
 
 
In vitro gametogenesis and reproductive cloning
Citation for published version (APA):
Segers, S., Pennings, G., Dondorp, W., de Wert, G., & Mertes, H. (2019). In vitro gametogenesis and
reproductive cloning: Can we allow one while banning the other? Bioethics, 33(1), 68-75.
https://doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12505
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2019
DOI:
10.1111/bioe.12505
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 05 Jan. 2021
68  |   wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/bioe Bioethics. 2019;33:68–75.© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
1  | INTRODUC TION
Both the creation of stem cell‐derived (SCD) gametes by means of in 
vitro gametogenesis (IVG) and reproductive cloning could enable cer‐
tain categories of (medically or socially) infertile couples to reproduce 
without the involvement of a third‐party gamete donor. However, 
while IVG is met with careful enthusiasm in the scientific community, 
reproductive cloning is met with moratoria and bans. In this paper we 
explore the moral arguments that are employed to oppose the use of 
reproductive cloning in case of involuntary childlessness, and inquire 
if or how these arguments also hold for the reproductive use of SCD 
gametes obtained from a person’s reprogrammed somatic cell.1
We first introduce both applications and discuss how arguments 
based on safety concerns can be held against both reproductive 
cloning and IVG.2 If one recognizes that both technologies hold sim‐
ilar safety risks, and if one believes that reproductive cloning should 
not be pursued because of these risks, it could be argued that one 
should conclude the same for the reproductive use of person‐spe‐
cific SCD gametes. Safety‐based arguments may, however, not be 
the decisive or exclusive concern. In the next section, we express our 
doubts about whether the benefits of IVG are able to outweigh the 
1We will refer to this as person‐specific SCD gametes (see below).
2We will not consider the non‐identity argument here, viz. the argument that offspring 
cannot be harmed by being brought into existence by a risky technique since without the 
use of it they would never have existed, provided that their level of welfare is not below 
the standard of wrongful life. For a discussion of this argument, see Lawlor, R. (2015). 
Questioning the significance of the non‐identity problem in applied ethics. Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 41, 893–896. Lawlor makes clear that the conclusion of the non‐identity 
argument is not the consensus view within bioethics. Moreover, if one does adhere to the 
non‐identity argument, it would dismiss safety concerns for both reproductive cloning and 
IVG. As we are looking for morally relevant differences between reproductive cloning and 
IVG (justifying a different approach), whether safety is considered relevant for both or ir‐
relevant for both has no impact on our general conclusion.
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Abstract
In vitro gametogenesis (IVG) is believed to be the next big breakthrough in reproduc‐
tive medicine. The prima facie acceptance of this possible future technology is nota‐
ble when compared to the general prohibition on human reproductive cloning. After 
all, if safety is the main reason for not allowing reproductive cloning, one might ex‐
pect a similar conclusion for the reproductive application of IVG, since both tech‐
nologies hold considerable and comparable risks. However, safety concerns may be 
overcome, and are presumably not the sole reason why cloning is being condemned. 
We therefore assess the non‐safety arguments against reproductive cloning, yet 
most of these can also be held against IVG. The few arguments that cannot be used 
against IVG are defective. We conclude from this that it will be hard to defend a ban 
on reproductive cloning while accepting the reproductive use of IVG.
K E Y W O R D S
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risks, while the benefits of reproductive cloning are not. Yet, as 
these safety concerns are based upon the present state of the art, 
and as it is possible that the current risks might be overcome over 
time, we then assess whether non‐safety‐based arguments against 
reproductive cloning can justify a prohibition on reproductive clon‐
ing, but not on the reproductive use of person‐specific SCD gam‐
etes. We conclude that, on the basis of these moral arguments, it will 
be hard to defend a ban on reproductive cloning while accepting the 
reproductive use of person‐specific SCD gametes. It should be noted 
that we cannot discuss all possible moral arguments against repro‐
ductive cloning that have ever been formulated, so we only discuss 
those that have most significantly shaped (and continue to shape) 
the ethical debate about human cloning. We do not exclude that in 
the future other moral arguments could be advanced to conclude 
that reproductive cloning is morally wrong, without affecting the 
moral acceptability of IVG.
We also wish to point out that we will focus on reproductive 
cloning for infertility reasons (medical or social) and that we will not 
discuss other, somewhat dubious, motivations, such as cloning to 
create ‘copies’ of admired individuals, to bring deceased persons 
‘back to life’, or to assemble an army of persons created by cloning. 
We assume that, above all, the demand for both technologies will 
come from medically or socially infertile people who want to con‐
ceive a child. In response, however, it could be argued that allowing 
cloning for infertility reasons might ultimately culminate in the use of 
cloning for these other purposes that are deemed (even more) con‐
troversial. Thus, it may be held that even if the moral arguments re‐
garding both technologies are very similar, there may still be 
pragmatic reasons for legally banning reproductive cloning but not 
IVG.3 Yet, if one were to accept these pragmatic reasons to legally 
ban reproductive cloning altogether, one would have to show why 
this same reasoning would not apply to IVG, since besides the use for 
infertility reasons, there are possible ‘controversial applications’ of 
IVG as well.4
2  | HUMAN REPRODUC TIVE CLONING 
AND REPRODUC TIVE USE OF SCD 
GAMETES
We here understand human reproductive cloning as the creation of a 
human being by means of somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). SCNT 
involves the insertion of a somatic cell nucleus into an enucleated 
oocyte. This would result in the asexual production of an individual 
who would have the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) of the oocyte 
donor (which is about 0.15% of the future child’s DNA), and shares 
the rest of his/her DNA with the donor of the somatic cell nucleus. 
Young women could use their own oocytes for this procedure so that 
there would be no ‘foreign’ mtDNA present in the resulting child.
Producing person‐specific gametes by means of IVG requires either 
the creation of an embryo via SCNT and differentiation of the embry‐
onic stem cells (ESCs) into gametes, or creation of induced pluripotent 
stem cells (iPSCs) and derivation of gametes from these.5 For both 
routes a somatic cell would be used, of the person for whom SCD gam‐
etes would be produced. The SCD gamete could then be combined with 
the complementary gamete of the other partner, resulting in an equal 
genetic relatedness between the future child and each parent.
The creation of ‘customized gametes’ has been lauded as a path‐
way to genetic parenthood for those who cannot procreate in a ‘nat‐
ural’ way and is met with reserved enthusiasm. What we mean by 
‘reserved enthusiasm’ is that, although there are calls for ethical re‐
flection on this new technology, it is also portrayed as the next big 
breakthrough in reproductive medicine. Although clinical applica‐
tion in humans is not around the corner yet, Hendriks et al. believe 
that these studies are ‘progressing steadily towards possible future 
clinical application’.6 Cohen et al. stated that IVG raises some ‘vexing 
policy challenges’, but that it is ‘poised for future success in humans 
and promises new possibilities for the fields of reproductive and re‐
generative medicine’.7 The Hinxton Group is sympathetic to the re‐
productive use of SCD gametes, but only if appropriate oversight 
structures are in place, and if early attempts are done ‘within the 
context of carefully conducted clinical research that conforms to the 
highest ethical standards’.8 In the U.K., the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority Horizon Scanning Panel expressed a similar 
view, maintaining that more research is required prior to potential 
clinical applications.9 It should, however, be noted that under the 
amended Human Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act 1990, the 
U.K. currently precludes SCD gametes, like reproductive cloning, 
from clinical application. Yet, interestingly, the public consultation 
that preceded the review of the HFE Act, contained a call by the U.K. 
government to allow ‘Parliament more flexibility to allow the use of 
[SCD gametes] in future should it wish to do so’.10 With respect to 
reproductive cloning, however, the document stated that ‘[t]he 
Government does not intend that the review of the HFE Act will 
open up those fundamental aspects of the legislation’.11
3We thank an anonymous Bioethics reviewer for pointing this out.
4For an overview of such ‘controversial applications’ of IVG, see: Segers, S., Pennings, G., 
& Mertes, H. (2017). Ethical reflections on stem cell‐derived gametes. Médecine de la 
Reproduction, 19, 298–306.
5Hendriks S., Dancet, E. A., van Pelt, A. M., Hamer, G., & Repping, S. (2015). Artificial 
gametes: A systematic review of biological progress towards clinical application. Human 
Reproduction Update, 21, 285–296.
6Ibid., p. 286.
7Cohen, I. G., Daley, G. Q., & Adashi, E. Y. (2017). Disruptive reproductive technologies. 
Science Translational Medicine, 9(372), pii: eaah5645.
8The Hinxton Group is an international and interdisciplinary group of mainly scientists, 
ethicists and lawyers that originally started as a project to review and debate ethical and 
legal challenges raised by stem cell science and embryo research. In 2009 they published 
their recommendations on the ethico‐legal issues that would be raised by IVG. See: 
Mathews, D. J. H., Donovan, P. J., Harris, J., Lovell‐Badge, R., Savulescu, J., & Faden, R. 
(2009). Pluripotent stem cell‐derived gametes: Truth and (potential) consequences. Cell 
Stem Cell, 5, 11–14.
9Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. (2010). Scientific Horizon Scanning at the 
HFEA. Annual Report 2009/10. London: Author.
10Department of Health. (2005). Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. A 
public consultation. London: Author. Retrieved June 1, 2018, from https://webarchive.na‐
tionalarchives.gov.uk/20130124071619/https://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/
groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4117872.pdf
11Ibid., p. 7.
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In most countries, reproductive cloning is not allowed and in 
many countries it can lead to custodial sentences.12 On an interna‐
tional level, reproductive cloning is opposed by the United Nations 
and the Council of Europe.13 It seems that the prospect of IVG in 
humans does not evoke a similarly dismissive public reaction. 
Although one could speculate that this might also have to do with an 
increased societal habituation to the influence of biotechnology on 
human lives, it may still be questioned why, apparently, this has not 
yet altered the consensus view on human reproductive cloning. 
Moreover, being (or not being) accustomed to certain practices does 
not, in itself, say how these should be valued morally.
3  | SAFET Y
Moral arguments against human reproductive cloning very often 
point back to safety concerns.14 There is, however, no clear‐cut indi‐
cation of the risks of this technology in humans. Apart from the 
failed attempt by Zavos and Illmensee to transfer a human SCNT 
embryo into a woman’s uterus, no attempts of human reproductive 
cloning have been reported.15 There is, nevertheless, ample experi‐
ence with cloning in other species: Rodriguez‐Osorio et al. report 
live offspring from 20 mammalian species created through SCNT.16 
Still, while various studies have reported on advancement of the 
SCNT protocols, and even though SCNT has entered commercial ap‐
plication in farm animals in several countries, the improvement re‐
mains marginal, and efficiency in terms of healthy offspring is still 
low.17 Several studies show a range of developmental abnormalities 
in offspring created by cloning, as well as high losses throughout 
early pre‐implantation, post‐implantation, and pre‐ and post‐natal 
development.18 Inadequate reprogramming of the somatic cell nu‐
cleus is regarded as the main reason for this low efficiency and it is 
held that there is no scientific reason to expect that this would be 
any different in humans.19 Thus, the general view is that overall clon‐
ing efficiency has not sufficiently increased to make the leap to 
human reproductive cloning.20
This raises the question whether creating person‐specific SCD 
gametes would be that much safer. Like cloning, the creation of 
person‐specific SCD gametes requires reprogramming of somatic 
cells. The success rate for reprogramming in humans is still very 
low, both for the SCNT and the iPSC route. It has been found that 
both ESC lines derived from SCNT embryos and iPSCs show a sim‐
ilar incidence of coding mutations, loss of imprinting and (epi)ge‐
netic defects, probably due to reprogramming as such, regardless 
of the reprogramming process.21 It might be the case, however, 
that due to the epigenetic reprogramming that takes place upon 
fertilization through DNA demethylation, epigenetic defects could 
be corrected in the case of IVG.22 If this would be so, then IVG 
would hold less risk of inducing epigenetic aberrations than clon‐
ing, as DNA demethylation seems to be the limiting factor in suc‐
cessful cloning.23 It remains to be proven, however, whether this 
epigenetic remodelling could sufficiently reduce the risk of possi‐
ble de novo epigenetic defects due to reprogramming. There are 
also concerns about increased risks for accumulation of chromo‐
somal aneuploidies, with possible negative health impacts for the 
future offspring.24 In view of this, it is believed that the risks are 
too high to use converted cells for therapeutic applications.25 In 
addition, IVG will hold risks associated with the differentiation of 
these reprogrammed cells into gametes, especially regarding their 
chromosomal and epigenetic stability.26 Moreover, the use of the 
SCD gametes in combination with other assisted reproductive 
12In France, for instance, reproductive cloning is qualified as a ‘crime against the human 
species’ and punished by 30 years’ imprisonment. See: United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation. (2009). Report of IBC on human cloning and interna-
tional governance. Paris: Author. Retrieved May 25, 2018, from https://unesdoc.unesco.
org/images/0018/001832/183235e.pdf
13Häyry, M. (2017). Synthetic biology and ethics: Past, present, and future. Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 26, 186–205; United Nations General Assembly. (2005). 
International convention against the reproductive cloning of human beings. Report of the sixth 
committee. New York, NY: Author. Retrieved May 31, 2018, from https://digitallibrary.un‐
.org/record/542699/files/A_59_516_Add.1‐EN.pdf; Council of Europe. (1998). Additional 
protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human 
Beings. Strasbourg: Author. Retrieved December 20, 2017, from https://rm.coe.
int/168007f2ca
14This is not to say, however, that there are no other ethical (non‐safety based) arguments 
against reproductive cloning. These will be explored below.
15Zavos, P., & Illmensee, K. (2006). Possible therapy of male infertility by reproductive 
cloning: One cloned human 4‐cell embryo. Archives of Andrology, 52, 243–254.
16Rodriguez‐Osorio, N., Urrego, R., Cibelli, J. B., Eilertsen, K., & Memili, E. (2012). 
Reprogramming mammalian somatic cells. Theriogenology, 78, 1869–1886.
17Loi, P., Iuso, D., Czernik, M., & Ogura, A. (2016). A new, dynamic era for somatic cell nu‐
clear transfer? Trends in Biotechnology, 34, 791–797; Niemann, H., & Lucas‐Hahn, A. 
(2012). Somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning: Practical applications and current legislation. 
Reproduction in Domestic Animals, 47, 2–10; Keefer, C. L. (2015). Artificial cloning of do‐
mestic animals. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, 112, 8874–8878; Long, C. R., Westhusin, M. E., & Golding, M. C. (2014). Reshaping 
the transcriptional frontier: Epigenetics and somatic cell nuclear transfer. Molecular 
Reproduction & Development, 81, 183–193.
18Ibid.; Dinnyes, A., Tian, X. C., & Oback, B. (2016). Nuclear transfer for cloning animals. In 
R. A. Meyers (Ed.), Reviews in cell biology and molecular medicine (pp. 79–117). Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA; Wilmut, I., Bai, Y., & Taylor, J. (2015). Somatic cell 
nuclear transfer: Origins, the present position and future opportunities. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 370(1680), 1–9.
19Rodriguez‐Osorio et al., op. cit. note 16, p. 1871; Dinnyes et al., op. cit. note 18, pp. 
106–107; Chung, Y., Matoba, S., Liu, Y., Eum, J. H., Lu, F., Jiang, W., … Zhang, Y. (2015). 
Histone demethylase expression enhances human somatic cell nuclear transfer efficiency 
and promotes derivation of pluripotent stem cells. Cell Stem Cell, 17, 758–766.
20Dinnyes et al., op. cit. note 18, pp. 106–107; Jaenisch, R. (2004). Human cloning – The 
science and ethics of nuclear transplantation. New England Journal of Medicine, 351, 
2787–2791.
21Wilmut et al., op. cit. note 18, p. 7; Johannesson, B., Sagi, I., Gore, A., Paull, D., Yamada, 
M., Golan‐Lev, T., … Egli, D. (2014). Comparable frequencies of coding mutations and loss 
of imprinting in human pluripotent cells derived by nuclear transfer and defined factors. 
Cell Stem Cell, 15, 634–642; Sebban, S., & Buganim, Y. (2016). Nuclear reprogramming by 
defined factors: Quantity versus quality. Trends in Cellular Biology, 26, 65–75.
22Fraser, R., & Lin, C. (2016). Epigenetic reprogramming of the zygote in mice and men: On 
your marks, get set, go! Reproduction, 152, R211–R222.
23Niemann, H. (2016). Epigenetic reprogramming in mammalian species after SCNT‐based 
cloning. Theriogenology, 86, 80–90.
24Moreno, I., Míguez‐Forjan, J. M., & Simón, C. (2015). Artificial gametes from stem cells. 
Clinical & Experimental Reproductive Medicine, 42, 33–44; Merkle, F., Ghosh, S., Kamitaki, 
N., Mitchell, J., Avior, Y., Mello, C., … Eggan, K. (2017). Human pluripotent stem cells recur‐
rently acquire and expand dominant negative P53 mutations. Nature, 545, 229–233.
25Sebban & Buganim, op. cit. note 21, p. 72.
26Hendriks et al., op. cit. note 5, p. 292.
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technologies (ARTs), such as intracytoplasmic sperm injection, 
might lead to an accumulation of (epi)genetic mutations in the fu‐
ture offspring.27 The creation of gametes from stem cells is also 
hindered by the fact that the risk of abnormalities increases with 
the time the cell lines are kept in culture.28 Although the risks in 
IVG are more hypothetical than those in reproductive cloning 
(given the more extensive experience with reproductive cloning in 
other animals), it is fair to say that, at present, reproductive use of 
person‐specific SCD gametes would be unacceptable given the 
high risks to the future child.29
4  | REPRODUC TIVE BENEFIT
As there is good reason to believe that IVG, like reproductive clon‐
ing, would hold considerable risks, a point could be made that if 
safety is the main reason not to proceed with human reproductive 
cloning, this would also hold for the reproductive use of person‐spe‐
cific SCD gametes. Accordingly, claims that further research might 
minimize the risks associated with IVG could also be applied to the 
case of reproductive cloning. Now, it may be countered that even if 
the risk of IVG is comparable to that of reproductive cloning, there 
may still be an additional reproductive benefit to IVG that could out‐
weigh this risk. That is, IVG could allow couples to parent a child who 
shares approximately 50% of both parents’ DNA. Reproductive clon‐
ing, on the other hand, only leads to genetic relatedness between 
the future child and one parent, with the exception of a minimal link 
to the mother if the female partner’s oocyte is used to clone the 
male partner. Two questions emerge here. First, can the prospect of 
shared and equal genetic relatedness between both prospective par‐
ents and the future child be regarded as a benefit of IVG over repro‐
ductive cloning? Second, to the extent that this is indeed a benefit, 
would it be important enough to justify taking higher risks?
With regard to the first question, it may be argued that the 
presumed added value is only relevant from the perspective of cou-
ples who wish to parent a child: for singles who wish to have a child 
of their own, the force of this presumed additional benefit would 
be cancelled out. For them, reproductive cloning would provide a 
strong genetic link with just one parent, which would be a benefit, 
rather than a disadvantage if this individual would prefer to avoid 
that his/her child would share half of his/her nuclear DNA with a 
gamete donor.30 While acknowledging this, the claim that for cou-
ples IVG has something to add that reproductive cloning has not, 
may still be valid. Moreover, it should be noted as an aside that IVG 
also holds perspectives of solo reproduction, namely if a ‘natural’ 
gamete could be combined with a derived gamete from the same 
individual. However, since we all carry potentially disease‐causing 
mutations, this would hold an extremely high risk of bringing such 
disease causing heterozygous mutations to homozygosity in the 
resulting child.31 As genome sequencing techniques become more 
effective, a more accurate picture of the average number of poten‐
tially disease‐causing mutations per person will become possible, 
which would also yield a clearer view on the risks of solo IVG.32 In 
the light of this, Whittaker stated that ‘reproductive cloning of hu‐
mans might begin to look pretty safe’.33
As a further qualification of the claim that, at least for couples, IVG 
would have an added benefit over reproductive cloning, it could be ar‐
gued that shared and equal genetic parenthood need not be the most 
important benefit for those requesting a form of assisted reproduction 
that would establish a genetic link. We cannot settle this issue here, but as 
already suggested in the previous paragraph and as indicated by Mertes, 
it may be that genetic parenthood is not what would be most important 
for many couples, but rather the avoidance of interventions in the family 
by other ‘parent‐candidates’.34 And that, indeed, is something that can be 
achieved not only through IVG, but also through reproductive cloning. 
Both techniques hold the reproductive benefit of avoiding potential inter‐
ventions by other ‘parent‐candidates’, but both techniques also hold con‐
siderable risks. But while this should again be acknowledged, it remains 
the case that for those couples who do put value on shared and equal 
genetic parenthood, the fact that this can be obtained through IVG but 
not through reproductive cloning, would count as a reproductive benefit.
This brings us to the second question: how much risk to future 
children should we allow as a price for which presumed reproductive 
benefits? Based on the ‘high risk of serious harm’ or ‘reasonable wel‐
fare’ principle set out by the European Society for Human Reproduction 
and Embryology, ‘[t]he fertility specialist should refuse to collaborate 
in the parental project of the would‐be parents if he or she judges that 
there is a high risk of serious harm to the future child’.35 In view of the 
27Master, Z. (2006). Embryonic stem‐cell gametes: The new frontier in human reproduc‐
tion. Human Reproduction, 21, 857–863.
28Lund, R., Närvä, E., & Lahesmaa, R. (2012). Genetic and epigenetic stability of human 
pluripotent stem cells. Nature Review Genetics, 13, 732–744.
29Segers, S., Mertes, H., de Wert, G., Dondorp, W., & Pennings, G. (2017). Balancing ethical 
pros and cons of stem cell derived gametes. Annals of Biomedical Engineering, 45, 
1620–1632.
30Devolder, K. (2014). Were it physically safe, human reproductive cloning may be permis‐
sible. In A. Caplan & R. Arp (Eds.), Contemporary debates in bioethics (pp. 79–89). Malden, 
MA: Wiley‐Blackwell.
31Xue, Y., Chen, Y., Ayub, Q., Huang, N., Ball, E. V., Mort, M., … 1000 Genomes Project 
Consortium. (2012). Deleterious‐ and disease‐allele prevalence in healthy individuals: 
Insights from current predictions, mutation databases, and population‐scale resequenc‐
ing. American Journal of Human Genetics, 91, 1022–1032.
32Ibid.
33Whittaker, P. (2007). Stem cells to gametes: How far should we go? Human Fertility, 10, 
1–5.
34Mertes, H. (2014). Gamete derivation from stem cells: Revisiting the concept of genetic 
parenthood. Journal of Medical Ethics, 40, 744–747. Although empirical evidence is not 
sufficient to settle a normative matter, it is also interesting to indicate that research has 
shown that lesbian couples raising donor‐conceived children consider the genetic link as a 
‘valuable extra’ (and not as a necessary condition for equality), but regard the avoidance of 
third party involvement as more important. See: Raes, I., Van Parys, H., Provoost, V., 
Buysse, A., De Sutter, P., & Pennings, G. (2014). Parental (in)equality and the genetic link 
in lesbian families. Journal of Reproduction & Infant Psychology, 32, 457–468.
35See: ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law. (2007). ESHRE Task Force on Ethics and Law 
13: The welfare of the child in medically assisted reproduction. Human Reproduction, 22, 
2585–2588. In this document, the context of natural reproduction is also compared to 
that of ART, where the involvement (and moral responsibility) of the assisting physician 
and the circumstances in which the future child is brought to life are considered to be 
morally relevant. This is further discussed in: de Wert, G. (1998). The post‐menopause: 
Playground for reproductive technology? Some ethical reflections. In J. Harris & S. Holm 
(Eds.), The future of human reproduction (pp. 221–237). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press; Cutas, D., & Bortolotti, L. (2010). Natural versus assisted reproduction. Studies in 
Ethics, Law & Technology, 4, 1–18.
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current safety risks that were discussed in the previous section, both 
IVG and reproductive cloning currently do not meet the standard for 
clinical applications. But what if the risks of both technologies could be 
minimized to, say, the level of risks we accept for other ARTs? This will 
be the subject of the remainder of this paper.
5  | ADDITIONAL NON‐SAFET Y‐BA SED 
ARGUMENTS
The discussion in the previous sections is necessarily based upon the 
current state of the art of both technologies. Thus, while there are 
good safety reasons not to proceed with human reproductive clon‐
ing at present, there might come a time in which its safety and effi‐
ciency will reach an acceptable level.36 The same goes for IVG.
Now, even if one would grant that the risks of both technolo‐
gies could be minimized to this level, this would not in itself be a 
sufficient condition for them to be morally acceptable. In the case 
of reproductive cloning, many people would probably still condemn 
it, even if it would be sufficiently safe. The fact that preclinical re‐
search into reproductive cloning is being forestalled points in the 
direction that safety is not the sole reason to condemn cloning (as 
this is a major impediment to making it sufficiently safe for clinical 
application). Additional non‐safety‐based arguments have been tar‐
geted against reproductive cloning, which might justify a decision 
not to clone humans. Thus, if one wishes to maintain a prohibition of 
reproductive cloning, but not of the reproductive use of person‐spe‐
cific SCD gametes, much will depend on the force of these additional 
non‐safety‐based arguments against reproductive cloning, as well as 
on how these affect IVG. In discussing these ethical arguments, we 
will inquire whether there are morally relevant differences between 
IVG and reproductive cloning that could justify a different moral 
judgment vis‐à‐vis these technologies.
5.1 | Dignity, instrumentalization, 
uniqueness and autonomy
Arguments that reproductive cloning is wrong because it breaches 
human dignity are commonly troubled because they often neither 
specify what ‘dignity’ means, nor why or how human reproductive 
cloning would breach it at all, or at least any more than other ARTs, 
including IVG.37 Is it wrong because it would instrumentalize the 
person created by cloning, or treat him/her as a mere means?38 The 
desire of having a (genetically related) child is the basis for most 
planned pregnancies though. As such, using reproductive cloning to 
overcome unwanted childlessness would not be more instrumental‐
izing than using IVG or other ways to have children, which can be 
said to be prima facie acceptable as long as these children are valued 
in their own right.39
Related arguments that cloning would breach the future child’s 
‘right to a unique identity’ and/or his or her ‘right to an open future’, 
have been discussed and refuted by, for example, Tooley and 
Brock.40 Already on a purely technical level, the two persons would 
not be genetically identical (given that they might have different 
mtDNA and that they would differ epigenetically). Moreover, our ge‐
netic make‐up is merely one part of our identity. As such, we do not 
consider identical twins to have the same identity. Furthermore, as 
persons created by SCNT cloning would grow up in a different time 
and environment, the differences between them would be even 
greater than the differences between identical twin siblings. 
Therefore, even if a ‘right to a unique identity’ did exist, it would not 
be breached by cloning. Likewise, the argument that cloning would 
restrict the future possibilities of the person created by cloning (be‐
cause the somatic cell donor would already have made the life 
choices that are still in the future of the person created by cloning), 
is rooted in a false belief in genetic determinism.41
It may, however, be speculated that the person created by clon‐
ing may nevertheless feel that her autonomy is constrained and/or 
that she is not a unique human being. Such feelings could cause psy‐
chological distress and negatively affect one’s well‐being.42 This is 
also the basis of Levick’s psychological argument that the person 
created by cloning might have difficulty in developing a unique per‐
sonal identity.43 While speculative, this concern is not unlikely.44 The 
concern is that because of the age difference between the person 
who is cloned and the person who is created by cloning, the latter 
might suffer from feeling pressure to be like the person whose ge‐
netic material was cloned. Indeed, this specific worry pertains much 
less to the case of IVG and natural reproduction, although it must be 
noticed that this is merely a difference in degree, not in kind, as chil‐
dren of successful adults may experience a similar kind of pressure. 
Yet, we do not outlaw reproduction of NFL players because of the 
pressure on their potential children. Also, it is important to notice 
that the actual impetus of this type of argument comes from the 
potential psychological harm to the future child, which is not exclu‐
sive to reproductive cloning, but also pertains to IVG.45 Watt, for 
36Devolder, op. cit. note 30, p. 81.
37Häyry, M. (2003). Philosophical arguments for and against human reproductive cloning. 
Bioethics, 17, 447–460.
38Ibid.; Kahn, A. (1997). Clone mammals... Clone man? Nature, 386, 119; Tooley, M. (1998). 
The moral status of the cloning of humans. In J. M. Humber & R. F. Almeder (Eds.), Human 
cloning (pp. 65–101). Totowa, NJ: Humana Press.
39Devolder, op. cit. note 30, p. 84.
40Tooley, op. cit. note 38, pp. 84–85, 93–94; Brock, D. (2003). Cloning human beings: An 
assessment of the ethical issues pro and con. In T. L. Beauchamp & L. Walters (Eds.), 
Contemporary issues in bioethics (pp. 593–602). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
41Ibid.; Devolder, op. cit. note 30, p. 82.
42Ibid.
43Levick, S. E. (2014). Were it physically safe, human reproductive cloning would not be 
acceptable. In A. L. Caplan & R. Arp (Eds.), Contemporary debates in bioethics (pp. 89–97). 
Malden, MA: Wiley‐Blackwell.
44Levick tries to substantiate this with evidence from the practice of psychiatry (especially 
identical twin cases). See: Ibid. In the debate with Levick, Devolder also agrees ‘that for 
some clones it may be psychologically somewhat more difficult’, which need not, however, 
entail a prohibition on cloning. Devolder, K. (2014). Reply to Levick. In A. L. Caplan & R. 
Arp (Eds.), Contemporary debates in bioethics (pp. 98–100). Malden, MA: Wiley‐Blackwell.
45In the past similar claims have also been made regarding IVF (which turned out to be 
untrue). Master, op. cit. note 27, pp. 859–860.
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instance, has argued that children born from ESC‐derived gametes 
might feel ‘cast adrift on the world’ since the embryo/genetic pro‐
genitor/gamete donor never existed as a person and could not possi‐
bly be known by the resulting offspring.46 Similarly, having knowledge 
that an embryo had to be intentionally destroyed for the resulting 
child to live might be a source of discomfort.47 Again, much will de‐
pend on how these issues will be framed and explained. The same 
goes for the iPSC‐route: saying that pluripotent stem cells were dif‐
ferentiated into a gamete and combined with another gamete, rather 
than that one is created out of a skin cell, could make quite a differ‐
ence. The bottom line is that these considerations are not less specu‐
lative than those regarding reproductive cloning.
It could be countered, however, that it is more likely that psycho‐
logical harm will ensue from cloning and/or that it would be more se‐
vere than that ensuing from IVG. Apart from how one could possibly 
substantiate this claim, it is dubious what the normative implication 
would be of this line of reasoning. For one thing, there is an important 
difference between the potential psychological harm from cloning and 
that ensuing from IVG: in the case of cloning, such harm would be pre‐
mised on a false belief, i.e., the belief in genetic determinism. It can 
sensibly be asked what such harm arising from false beliefs norma‐
tively implies.48 At least in this case, it does not in itself provide a suf‐
ficient reason to ban cloning, rather than to engage in serious 
educational campaigns to correct the false belief in genetic 
determinism.49
5.2 | Creating offspring with a particular genome
A second type of argument against human reproductive cloning 
has to do with the moral unease that this technology could be used 
to create a child with particular genetic traits or to create people 
with a ‘favourable’ genotype.50 However, IVG might also be di‐
rected towards this end. First, if IVG could be used to create large 
numbers of gametes, these could be used to create many embryos, 
which could facilitate screening and selection in accordance with 
the future parents’ preferences.51 A second scenario is to create 
SCD gametes from several individuals with desirable genetic traits 
which could then be recombined to create embryos, which would 
again be used to create SCD gametes, and so on until one obtains 
the embryo with the desired traits.52 While in these scenarios, as 
well as in the cloning scenario, the ‘choice’ of the future child’s 
genetic traits would be limited to the initial genotype from which 
one starts, this could be overcome by a third scenario in which IVG 
would facilitate direct genome editing. That is, if it were possible 
to edit (e.g., via CRISPR/Cas9) stem cells that were obtained from 
a person’s somatic cell and if these could be differentiated into 
gametes through IVG, then this might facilitate the creation of a 
child with specific genetic traits through direct genome editing. 
However, it is not a priori evident that it is morally wrong to choose 
which genetic information to pass along to the future child (re‐
gardless of the technique that is employed to do this).53 Moreover, 
even though both IVG and reproductive cloning could be used to 
create children with a particular genome, these specific uses could 
be prevented through regulation. Note that also PGD can be used 
to select an embryo based on non‐medical traits, but that regula‐
tions and guidelines are put in place to limit such use.54
5.3 | Opportunity costs and conflicting interests
Another set of non‐safety‐based arguments against human reproduc‐
tive cloning has to do with justice concerns. The most common version, 
which is according to some ‘the most plausible case’ against human re‐
productive cloning, holds that cloning affronts the just distribution of 
scarce public resources.55 The assumption of this argument is that 
healthcare interests that fall short of a certain standard outweigh the 
reproductive interest that could be served by an expensive reproduc‐
tive technology like cloning.56 However, if one follows this line of rea‐
soning, one should be aware that it also cuts across the case of IVG for 
reproduction: IVG will, at least in the beginning, most likely be an ex‐
pensive technology and state funding of IVG treatment would also take 
away healthcare budget that could have been spent on other pur‐
poses.57 Thus, this is a clear line of argument against human reproduc‐
tive cloning, but it is similar to, if not exactly alike, the one that can be 
advanced against IVG (and the one that Rulli advanced against mito‐
chondrial replacement techniques).58
A possible variant of this argument holds that allowing reproduc‐
tive cloning in humans would imply ‘the avoidable neglect’ of the 
46Watt, H. (2014). Ancestor embryos: Embryonic gametes and genetic parenthood. 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 40, 759–761.
47Relatedly: for those who oppose the intentional destruction of human embryos, the 
SCNT route for creating person‐specific SCD gametes would be a greater moral wrong 
than reproductive cloning: the former inherently involves embryo destruction, while the 
latter does not. This, however, only holds for the SCNT variant of IVG, as embryo destruc‐
tion is not an inherent aspect of the iPSC route.
48Tooley, op. cit. note 38, p. 94.
49Lewontin, R. (2001). It ain’t necessarily so: The dream of the human genome and other illu-
sions. New York: New York Review of Books.
50Steinbock, B. (2006). Reproductive cloning: Another look. University of Chicago Legal 
Forum, 2006(1), 87–112; Thomas, C. (2017). Novel assisted reproductive technologies and 
procreative liberty: Examining in vitro gametogenesis relative to currently practiced as‐
sisted reproductive procedures and reproductive cloning. Southern California 
Interdisciplinary Law Journal, 26, 623–648.
51Bourne, H., Douglas, T., & Savulescu, J. (2012). Procreative beneficence and in vitro ga‐
metogenesis. Monash Bioethics Review, 30, 29–48.
52Sparrow termed this scenario ‘in vitro eugenics’ (emphasis added). Yet, it could be nuanced 
that this technique is not necessarily eugenic, but that it could also be applied to obtain 
certain non‐disease related traits in the future child that are not aimed at creating ‘better’ 
children. Sparrow, R. (2014). In vitro eugenics. Journal of Medical Ethics, 40, 725–731.
53Kamm, F. M. (2005). Is there a problem with enhancement? American Journal of Bioethics, 
5, 5–14.
54For an elaboration, see: Segers, S., Pennings, G., Dondorp, W., de Wert, G., & Mertes, H 
In vitro gametogenesis and the creation of ‘designer babies’. Cambridge Quarterly of 
Healthcare Ethics (forthcoming).
55Gillon, R. (2003). Human reproductive cloning: A look at the arguments against it and a 
rejection of most of them. In T. L. Beauchamp & L. Walters (Eds.), Contemporary issues in 
bioethics (pp. 621–632). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
56For a critical discussion of this argument, see Williams, M. (2009). Resource expenditure 
not resource allocation: Response to McDougall on cloning and dignity. Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 35, 330–334.
57Segers et al., op. cit. note 29.
58For the discussion of mitochondrial replacement techniques, see Rulli, T. (2016). What is 
the value of three‐parent IVF? Hastings Center Report, 46, 38–47.
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interests of children that are up for adoption.59 The underlying idea 
is that reproductive cloning would take away the primary motivation 
to adopt, which would result in the neglect of the interests of those 
children who need to be adopted. Again, difficulties to predict such 
long‐term consequences aside, this concern applies equally well to 
other forms of ART that provide alternatives to adoption.60 As noted 
by Strong:
If cloning should be prohibited in an attempt to help 
children who would benefit from adoption, then to be 
consistent should not one also advocate the banning 
of donor insemination, ovum donation, controlled 
ovarian stimulation, and in vitro fertilization?61
One could also add IVG to this list.
5.4 | Strangeness and the ‘basic structure of sexual 
reproduction’
Finally, much of the opposition against cloning probably has to do 
with emotive ‘gut’ reactions: it is perceived as strange, unnatural 
and/or as a way of ‘playing God’. Even if these feelings would be ac‐
corded moral weight, it can be asked whether IVG would be less 
strange or more natural. One might state that IVG would restore the 
‘natural order’ of a woman and a man with genetically related chil‐
dren, but mere reference to the ‘natural order’ does not entail the 
normative conclusion that this is how things ought to be (unless one 
adds the moral premise that things that are according to the natural 
order, are good). Still, it can be noted that IVG and other ARTs differ 
from cloning, in the sense that cloning deviates from the ‘basic struc‐
ture of sexual reproduction—the combination of genetic material 
from father and mother resulting in a genetically unique child’, of 
which the outcome is unpredictable, and the child’s genetic endow‐
ment ‘uncontrolled and undesigned’.62 As we already noted, it is un‐
true that the person created by cloning will be identical to the person 
who is cloned, and as such the ‘outcome’ of the former’s personal 
development remains unpredictable. It is true that cloning departs—
more than IVG—from the basic structure of sexual reproduction in 
the sense that it is a form of asexual reproduction, but it is unclear 
why this would be a fundamental moral problem. Moreover, it seems 
that this argument is quite easily invalidated by the reversal test: 
imagine a world in which ceteris paribus human reproduction would 
happen in an asexual manner, via cloning, instead of in a sexual way. 
Would we then persist that it would be better from a moral point of 
view to switch to an artificial way of reproduction where two ge‐
nomes are randomly reshuffled? It would seem to us that this 
unpredictability would rather be deemed suboptimal and dangerous, 
not in the least in view of possible risks for autosomal recessive ge‐
netic conditions that are transmitted to the future child when both 
parents carry the recessive trait.63
6  | CONCLUDING REMARKS
We explored the safety concerns for both reproductive cloning and 
the reproductive use of person‐specific SCD gametes, and found 
that there is good reason to believe that both technologies pres‐
ently hold comparable risks. In view of this, it could be argued that if 
safety concerns are the prime reason not to proceed with reproduc‐
tive cloning in humans, it might inform a similar conclusion for the 
reproductive use of person‐specific SCD gametes. This could justify 
a moratorium on clinical applications of both IVG and reproductive 
cloning, but not a ban on preclinical research into these techniques. 
Safety, however, is presumably not the sole reason for which cloning 
is being condemned. We therefore also explored some of the most 
current non‐safety objections against reproductive cloning. We in‐
dicated that most of these arguments can also be held against the 
reproductive use of person‐specific SCD gametes, and that those ar‐
guments that do not hold for IVG are ill informed or based on ill‐de‐
fined concepts. From this it could be argued that if those arguments 
against reproductive cloning that can also be held against IVG are 
considered to provide a strong enough case against human cloning, 
the same conclusion would seem to follow for IVG. Or, conversely, 
that if one finds them unconvincing as arguments against IVG, the 
case against reproductive cloning should also be deemed inconclu‐
sive if it is based on these same arguments. It seems that, when push 
comes to shove, it will be hard to defend, on the basis of these argu‐
ments, a ban on reproductive cloning while accepting the reproduc‐
tive use of person‐specific SCD gametes.
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